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Abstract 
Despite headline-grabbing accounts of the ‘Man-cession’ and childless metropolitan-dwelling 
women who earn more than men, the gender wage gap remains persistent. However, the 
spatiality of the gender wage gap has received little attention. I ask whether, where, and how the 
gender wage gap changed with The Great Recession. Using American Community Survey 
pooled surveys for 2005-7 and 2011-13, I model counterfactual wage distributions for full-time 
male and female workers in the top 100 metropolitan areas of the U.S., controlling for education, 
age, experience, and occupation. Gender inequality is polarizing spatially and across the wage 
distribution, and the recession exacerbates this pattern. Gender gaps decline most in the Rustbelt, 
but show relative increases in many Western metropolitan areas. Further, declines are mostly 
amongst below-median earning workers, whereas increases are likely at the 75th or 90th 
percentiles. Disproportionate returns to men’s characteristics explain much of these geographic 
and distributional shifts. The combination of geographic and distributional analysis reveals a 
more thorough picture of how gender inequality shifted with the recession, as previous patterns 
of uneven development under economic restructuring are still evident. The analysis also 
signposts regions of emerging gender inequality where relative gender equality is often 
presumed, suggesting critical research directions for feminist and economic geographers.
 “If you're paying attention to the numbers, you could be forgiven for thinking that the recession 
represents some kind of feminist watershed” 
Dana Goldstein, 2009. “Pink-Collar Blues: Does the Recession Provide an Opportunity to 
Remedy Occupational Gender Segregation?”  The American Prospect. 
 
Introduction 
Gender wage inequality has received significant attention in US academic and policy research 
since women first formed significant proportions of the labor force nearly five decades ago. 
During the recent Great Recession, however, media profiles of male job loss and higher-earning 
female partners signaled that the gender wage gap might have all-but evaporated. Stories of 
women’s relative economic gains fronted media analysis under the heading of the ‘Man-cession’, 
and the approximately ¼ of married US households (Pew 2013) where women earned more than 
their partners warranted concern with emasculating gender relations and marital stability 
(Rampel 2009, Roisin 2010). As Goldstein’s comment above points out, the recession was seen, 
at least in the popular imagination, as a boon to gender equality, if only through its acceleration 
of increasingly depressing outcomes for male workers, especially those who had benefitted from 
the last vestiges of a once-vibrant manufacturing economy. More recent analysis points out that 
men have been regaining jobs more quickly in the recovery (Norris, 2013). 
 However, despite women’s relative gains, largely attributable to men’s greater job losses, 
the gender wage gap in 2010 remained only a few percentage points lower than a decade 
previously (Goldin 2014). President Obama’s 2014 State of the Union address placed the .77 
ratio of female to male annual earnings strongly back on the agenda, although this generated 
critical attention to the calculation of the gender wage gap. Debate over the magnitude of the gap 
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hinges in on gender differences in skills and attachment to the labor force, as controlling for 
these differences greatly diminishes the gap. The gender gap in weekly earnings, (reflecting 
women’s greater time out of the labor force) is just under 20%, but still does not account for 
skills or other differences between men and women (Hegewisch et al 2013). While we know that 
the gender wage gap and differences between men’s and women’s labor force characteristics 
continued to diminish with the recession, we know little about the spatial variation in this 
diminution, and attention to the patterns of gender inequality across the wage distribution has 
been scant. This is significant because both the spatiality and the shape of the gender wage gap 
are critical to understanding its recent shifts. In addition, as I hope to demonstrate here, the 
gendered distribution of earnings has a spatiality itself, one intricately connected to major 
economic shifts in the US economy. 
Thus, this paper attempts to add spatial variance in the gender wage gap and its 
constitution to reports of how gender inequality declined during the recent recession. Using 
2005-2007 (pre-recession) and 2011-2013 (post-recession) pooled files from the American 
Community Survey for the largest 100 metropolitan areas, I model overall counterfactual 
distributions of full-time full-year men’s and women’s earnings using quantile regressions that 
allow effects of labor market characteristics to vary across the distribution. Examining the 
overall relative distribution of earnings and skills (rather than a single or aggregated point) 
allows better understanding of gender inequality. Considering the varying geographic paths of 
the recession and differently gendered labor markets begs the question of whether women have 
improved their position relative to men everywhere and to the same extent. Further, if the 
geography of the recession has been variable, as has often been asserted in studies of the housing 
market (Wyly and Ponder 2011, Lichtenstein and Weber 2015) has this variability affected how 
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gender inequality is assessed? Finally, I decompose the counterfactual distributions into 1) gaps 
explained by labor force characteristics and 2) the coefficient returns to these characteristics. The 
resulting picture of “unexplained” inequality allows a glimpse of where gaps are due to unequal 
returns rather than compositional effects. 
Although the gender wage gap shows signs of decline overall, there are several larger 
metropolitan areas where it increases throughout the wage distribution, and others where it 
remains static as the recession proceeds. Most metro areas have polarizing distributions, such 
that the gender wage gap increases or stagnates above the median even as it decreases below. 
The suggestion that women fared well compared with men as the recession proceeded masks 
spatial and distributional variation, and limits understanding of how they are related. Attention to 
the spatiality of relative wage profiles suggests that even places with advantages for highly-
skilled women were not as beneficial for them as for comparable men. Further, the spatiality of 
the distribution (by which I mean the spatial variation in the magnitude of the gender wage gap 
and how it varies over the wage distribution) and how it changes with the recession point to 
gendered shifts in the American economy. Some of these are old patterns that shift into new 
places, some are continuations or intensifications or diminutions of old patterns, and some point 
to emerging geographies of gender wage inequality. Lastly, there is a spatiality of “unfair” 
inequality as well. While labor force differences between men and women sometimes explain a 
good deal, much of the gender wage gap between full-time workers is still explained by 
differences in returns to these characteristics. Even in places with declining gender wage gaps, 
there are often relative increases to men’s returns, especially toward the top of the wage 
distribution. 
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Explaining the Gender Wage Gap Across Time and Space  
Explanations of the gender wage gap generally focus on women’s lower labor force attachment 
and working hours (especially as a result of childbearing or childcare), gendered differences in 
educational attainment or labor market experience, and imbalances between men’s and women’s 
industries and occupations (Blau and Khan 2007, Autour 2011, Shen 2014). Reductions in 
relevant labor market differences and employment conditions between men and women over 
time have thus been used to explain the diminishing gender wage gap, although many scholars 
argue that progress toward gender equality began to slow sometime in the 1990s (Tomaskovic et 
al 2006, Hegewisch et al 2010, England 2010, 2011). Occupational differences remain a key 
concern because 1) occupational segregation by gender, while declining, is still considerable and 
2) there is considerable evidence that the gendering of occupations, rather than the gendering of 
skill or occupational choice, is what results in wage inequality (England, Allison and Wu 2007). 
Relatedly, recent research has documented that the “motherhood penalty” results not just from 
time out of the labor market, but also from employers’ stereotyping of womens’ reduced 
productivity regardless of whether or not they have children (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). 
Older industrial labor market structures including unionization, industrial concentration, 
and the prevalence of large firms, have also been associated with male earnings advantages 
(Kilbourne et al 1994, Kalleberg 2011). Although these conditions diminished with 
globalization, they continue to work against gender equity in their decline (Gauchat, Kelly and 
Wallace 2012). Confusingly, some of the same macro-level economic shifts generally associated 
with reduced gender inequality have produced relative as well as absolute benefits to male 
workers. Changes associated with post-Fordism and economic restructuring arguably explain 
both the reduction in gender inequality and its intransigence. For example, the reduced 
significance of manufacturing employment is usually associated with disproportionately negative 
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effects for men, given their overrepresentation in manufacturing employment, and the 
historically good wages and contracts surrounding these jobs (Harrison and Bluestone 1988). 
Debates around skills-based technological change have thus emphasized globalization’s 
detrimental effects for less-educated male workers (Autour 2011, Kalleberg 2011). However, 
globalization’s polarizing effects were presumed to disproportionately benefit men with high-
level managerial or technical positions, relative to women who are more likely end up in poorly-
remunerated service jobs (McCall 1998). Thus, accounts of the reasons for gender earnings 
inequality and its decline play into more recent discussions of the gender wage gap and the role 
of occupational concentration under increasingly contingent terms of employment. 
 In trying to understand these relationships, McCall’s research into the spatiality of 
globalization and economic restructuring followed geographic accounts of changing labor market 
conditions and ramifications for relational earnings inequality (Massey 1984, Peck 1989). She 
found that 1) in declining labor markets with high levels of labor casualization less-educated 
workers fared very poorly but women fared relatively worse, and that 2) in high-wage labor 
market educational gains benefitted women less than men. While regions that retained 
manufacturing employment benefitted less-educated men (increasing the gender wage gap), 
regions rich in service employment showed reduced gender wage inequality because less-
educated men fared poorly (1998). In Complex Inequality (2001), McCall argued that local labor 
market configurations of inequality translated the effects of economic restructuring such that 
intersectional gender, racial, and class inequities could be either intensified or diminished, even 
as they persisted.  
Subsequent related analyses have similarly utilized US metropolitan areas to explore 
variation in gender inequality and its causes. Ranking occupation-industry employment cells 
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across metro areas, Cohen and Huffman found gender wage inequality greatest where female-
dominated jobs are ranked lower on the wage hierarchy (2003). Dinovitzer and Hagan (2013) 
found that labor markets with greater gender dissimilarity in employment depress the wages of 
women in law. And Gauchat, Kelly, and Wallace (2012) conclude that gendered occupational 
segregation within metropolitan areas matters more than globalization’s overall effects in terms 
of explaining gender inequality. Thus, these studies empirically extend the recursive nature of 
McCall’s analysis of how macro-level economic shifts (like economic restructuring) have 
varying implications for the gender wage gap, through further elaboration of how locally-
configured gender inequality conditions individual and group outcomes. Their labor market-scale 
analyses also add evidence to earlier arguments (like those cited above) that women’s 
occupational concentration is a way in which wage gaps are maintained, rather than simply a 
measure of differing skills or workplace attachment (Reskin, Tomaskovic-Dewey et al 2006, 
England 2010). 
 With the most recent shift to recession, academic attention to occupational gendering 
increases. First, as mentioned above, ‘the Man-cession’, as it is quickly dubbed, is largely due to 
male job loss in industries (construction and manufacturing) hardest hit by economic downturn 
(Sahin, Song, and Hobijn 2010). Accounts proliferate of how unemployed men begin to enter 
booming and relatively-secure health care jobs (Dwyer 2013), gaining employment in an 
industry that had been dominated by women’s employment from the 1970s onward (McDowell 
2015). Although men working in this industry face lower wages overall than in manufacturing 
jobs, more-educated white men climb into more technical, better-paid jobs within the relatively-
secure health care sector (Dill, Price-Glynn, and Rakovski 2016). Within this industry, as in the 
overall economy, feminist scholars find evidence that women’s poorer employment conditions 
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‘buffer’ men’s higher wages and/or more secure ‘core’ employment from the negative effects of 
the recession (Reskin and Roos 1990, Grimshaw and Rubery 2007, Rubery and Rafferty 2013).  
Although geographic accounts have been sparse, a recent analysis of women’s increasing 
creative class employment by Florida, Mellander and King (2014) suggests “… we should expect 
states that are more open and tolerant, and where talent and technology are more concentrated to 
be better places for women to succeed economically”. Examining state-to-state variance in 
women’s wages and creative class employment, they find some support for this hypothesis, 
whilst noting the striking persistence of the gender wage gap everywhere. However, their 
analysis of ACS data relies on comparing women (and sometimes, creative class women) across 
states, rather than comparing women to men. Analyses from Europe are more critical of creative 
employment’s promise for women, suggesting that the inequalities of work in this field, 
especially as related to open-ended flexible hours and contact-driven careers, are particularly 
punitive for women and ethnic minorities (see, for example, Gill and Pratt 2008; Conor, Gill, and 
Taylor and their contributors 2015).   
In this vein, it is important to emphasize that heternormative ideas about women’s 
proclivities and abilities, economic roles and gendered household practices, and related state 
policies continue to shape gendered stereotypes and hiring; allocation across firms, industries, 
and occupations; and working conditions including remuneration. Paula England’s analysis of 
the stalled “gender revolution” reevaluates these patterns, concluding that progress toward 
greater equity has been stymied (2010; 2011).  There is little doubt that structural differences in 
treatment by gender continue with the recession, increasing women’s vulnerability to decreasing 
employment or job quality. For these reasons, as well as diminishing public sector employment 
under austerity, MacLeavy (2011) argues that the recession disproportionately threatens female 
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jobs in the UK. Rubery (2015) adds that just as social welfare systems helped to configure 
gender inequality, austerity’s workfare policies may push some women into the workforce in 
ways that reinforce or intensify gender inequality. These latter perspectives are virtually absent 
from current US discussion (perhaps as public sector employment is neither as feminized nor as 
beneficial, and certainly as the social safety net was less expansive), where emphasis on men’s 
losses remains dominant. In part, this may be due to the dominance of arguments about skills-
based technological change or manufacturing decline in a literature that emphasizes men’s 
wages. It may also be due to the emphases on states in a federal system (with widely varying 
labor force regulations and dynamics) rather than a more European focus on the state and its role 
in shaping social inequality. 
 All of these conflicting accounts remind us that explanations of the gender wage gap are 
different from explanations of how it is changing (Kassenboehmer and Sinning 2014), whether 
over the long-term of the past half-century or the short-term of the recent recession. The two 
types of explanations rely upon each other but also critically upon understanding the relative 
shape and shift of men’s and women’s wage distributions. Too often, discussions of gender 
inequality focus on men and women in only one part of the wage distribution (as amongst the 
creative class, for example), or postulate women and men in different parts of the wage 
distribution or women as totally absent from the manufacturing-dominant middle.1 Since the 
1970s, gender inequality has declined much more at the bottom of the wage distribution (due to 
women’s increased participation and the “floors” provided by minimum wage legislation) than at 
the top, where smaller declines are more attributable to women’s educational gains (Blau and 
																																																						
1	England’s 2011 reply to McCall’s 2010 suggestion that younger women increasingly move into the top decile 
of earnings: “… central tendency is not the only relevant metric for assessing progress”, is critical.  It also 
points out the need for counterfactual analysis since women in the top decile still show significant gaps with 
top decile men. 
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Kahn 2007, Kassenboehmer and Sinning 2014). Bernhardt, Morris and Handcock’s 1999 caveat 
that gender inequality can diminish with only minimal gains (or even absolute losses) for 
women, if men’s earnings are stagnating or in decline, is evident in the current research. In 
addition to greater attention to gendered wage distributions, looking at their geography is crucial 
to linking the above accounts of differences between men and women and broader economic 
shifts. The current paper is not the first to realize this, although its linking of counterfactual 
distributions and geography under recession is new. 
 Despite McCall’s emphasis on varying local labor market configurations of inequality 
and Florida et al’s suggestions that women should fare relatively better in creative class 
locations, there has been little explicit examination of gender wage inequality in geography. This 
is notable as sociologists turn to spatial examinations of economic inequality. However, 
geographers’ analysis of economic restructuring and poverty (Kodras 1997, Glasmeier 2005), 
and the sub-urban scale of gender inequality (Hanson and Pratt 1991, England 1993, McLafferty 
and Preston 1993, Carlson and Persky 1999), have inspired many of the geographical inquiries of 
sociologists (McCall 2001, Lobao, Hooks and Tickamyer 2008). As mentioned above, a related 
body of work by UK and European geographers suggests important questions about shifting 
patterns of women’s employment under austerity (MacLeavy 2011) and with the rise of creative, 
knowledge-industry employment (Gill and Pratt 2008, Conor, Gill, and Taylor 2015). Although 
this work has a different empirical and theoretical framing, it has relevance for the results of the 
current research. I am also mindful of the repeated calls of feminist geographers for more 
empirical investigation of the spatiality of structural inequality. (Valentine 2007, McLafferty and 
Preston 2010, McDowell 2015). The thickly descriptive exploratory analysis presented here is an 
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attempt to tease out some of those empirics: those that govern one piece of how places shape 
changing gender inequality in the workforce.  
 
Data and Modelling Approach  
Data come from 3-year pooled samples of the American Community Survey. Large annual 
samples make the ACS ideal for analyzing economic shifts across metropolitan areas during the 
recent recession. Since each year of the ACS reflects the previous year’s data, the 2005-7 and 
2011-2013 samples analyzed here include a pre-recession 2004-6 period and a post-recession 
2010-12 period. Multi-year samples are adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics-provided Consumer Price Index for the third year of each cycle and adjusting weights 
1/3 for each year. The samples are restricted to nearly full-time (at least 35 hours worked per 
week) full-year (at least 50 weeks worked) non-self-employed workers aged 25-55 in the 
previous year, and not resident in group or institutional quarters.  The intent of the age restriction 
is to as nearly as possible capture only prime-age workers not in an introductory job or nearing 
retirement, as these workers would have been disproportionately affected by economic shifts. In 
the quantile regressions described below, the dependent income variable includes each worker’s 
total pre-tax income from wages and salaries in the previous year.2 All positive wage income is 
logged, and regressed on continuous Mincerian variables of age, years of education, and 
																																																						
2	Studies of the gender wage gap customarily examine weekly or annual earnings, rather than an hourly pay 
rate, in order to get a broader picture of earnings inequality that may also include differences in pay structure 
(salaried versus non-salaried, access to overtime pay, etc) (see for example Bernhardt, Morris and Handcock 
1995; Gould 2016). I have chosen, as do most of the authors cited here, to examine annual earnings gaps 
since I control for mostly full-time, full-year workers and because I am mostly interested in the variances 
between metropolitan areas across the full distribution of wages. Weekly wage gaps would be lower but 
should not (given sample controls) be systematically different.	
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experience (age-6-education).3 Although I agree with many of the authors cited above that 
occupations are not exogenously chosen or rewarded, I also include 11 commonly-used 
occupational dummies4 for purposes of decomposition. All workers with less than 1 year or more 
than 40 years of experience by this calculation are removed from the sample. The ACS topcodes 
income at the 99th percentile for each state and averages all values above this point. This 
represents a somewhat minimal specification of labor force characteristics, although one 
commonly employed in assessment of the gender wage gap, and certainly one that is more 
sensitive to the differences than the summary estimates provided in the introduction. Remaining 
differences between men and women are arguably due less to individual differences than to 
differences in how they experience labor market sorting and allocation processes.   
 The challenge is estimating a counterfactual wage distribution, when in fact no such thing 
exists in pure empirical form. Recent approaches have attempted to model overall wage 
distributions, often over two time periods, conditional upon a series of characteristics that 
explain wage densities, and then decomposing these distributions for characteristics across the 
distribution (Machada and Mata 2005, Melly 2006, Fortin, Firpo and Lemieux 2011). The 
approach chosen here follows Melly most closely, using bootstrapped quantile regressions to 
estimate conditional wage distributions. Integrating the entire conditional wage distribution over 
the full range of the covariates yields an estimated unconditional wage distribution. Here, this 
allows for the identification of the counterfactual function expressing women’s wages if they 
were rewarded for their characteristics as men are, and the further decomposition of the 
																																																						
3	These data are not longitudinal and do not have information about the time workers may have spent out of 
the labor market, (except for the preceding year in which case the individual was excluded from the sample). 
4	These are Management, Business, and Finance; Other Professional; Services; Sales; Office Support; 
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing; Construction and Extraction; Installation, Maintenance and Repair; 
Production; Transportation and Materials Maintenance; and Military. These are general census occupational 
codes, and also follow Reskin (among others). I also separated Management, Business and Finance from 
other Professional due to the gendered structure of employment and salaries in this first sector.	
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unconditional quantile function into the effects of characteristics/covariates and 
returns/coefficient, such that 
 
!	($%, χ() = +,- !: 10 12	 − 1245	62758975 1(:9; $< 12 ≤ !	) ≥ ?  
 
is the qth quantile of the counterfactual distribution for women’s characteristics and men’s 
prevailing wage distribution. Research on the gender wage gap often employs Oaxaca-Blinder-
type decomposition techniques to account for the portion of the gender wage gap due women’s 
generally lower levels of education and experience (covariates), versus the differing returns to 
these characteristics (coefficients). Unlike Oaxaca-Blinder type models, the formulation 
employed here allows the effects of the covariates to vary over the distribution. This is especially 
important in that the effects of workplace characteristics, especially education, have different 
effects on the gender wage gap amongst higher-earning and lower-earning workers. The 
decomposition is reported briefly, although the primary focus is on the geographic variance in 
counterfactual-estimated gender inequality and how it changes. 
Counterfactual quantile distributions are estimated for men’s and women’s wages in the 
top 100 metropolitan areas of the United States, all with over 500,000 population by 2010. The 
distributions were estimated at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile with 50 bootstraps in 
each case.5 Thus, we can see how the adjusted gender wage gap differs for some of the lowest-
paid workers, those at the top of the bottom quarter, those at the median, those at the bottom of 
																																																						
5	These were performed using Melly’s cdeco command in Stata. The results are not reported in a table as they 
are bulky and are summarized in the Figures. All estimates were bootstrapped and only Durham (at the 10th 
and 25th percentiles in 2005-7) and Fresno (at the 10th percentile in 2011-13) were not statistically significant 
at the .05 level. Detailed tabular results are available upon request from the author.	
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the top quarter, and those just entering the top decile of workers (due to top-coded rounding of 
income above the 99th percentile this is approximate). The choice of the top decile rather than the 
top 1% or 5 % was made to examine the top-earning professionals, rather than elites whose pay 
structures and job characteristics are significantly different and rare. The 90th percentile is much 
higher in New York than in Janesville-Beloit, but concepts of relative place in a labor market’s 
wage distribution are reasonably intact. More percentiles would have increased resolution but 
greatly increased computation time as well as interpretation of results. The models employed 
shed light on the varying shapes and magnitude of gender inequality across metro areas both 
before and after the recession. 
 
Results 
 
Counterfactual wage distributions  << Figure 1 about here>> 
In Figure 1, I have divided the top 50 metro areas (all with over 1 million population in 2010) 
into regions. Although the gender wage gap usually increases steeply across the wage 
distribution, there are significant variations in its magnitude and shape. One of the steepest 
shapes is in New York City, where the gender wage gap is 15% at the 10th quantile (10% post-
recession) but 40% at the 90th quantile (38% post-recession). Austin and Houston look similar, 
and Research Triangle Raleigh’s similarly steep gap increases with the recession. In these 
metros, low-earning women earn less than similar men but high-earning men earn much more 
than high-earning women. Contrastingly, women in Riverside consistently earn 20-25% less than 
men, and gaps in Detroit are higher but similarly flat. Low-earning and high-earning women in 
these metros fare similarly poorly relative to men with similar characteristics. Post-recession, 
most metro areas preserve their overall shapes. Polarization (where the gap declines much more 
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at the bottom, or even increases at the top) is the most common shape shift. In other words, the 
documented decline in the gender wage gap has mostly occurred amongst the lowest-earning 
workers, where men’s and women’s wages are closest. These patterns have been produced over 3 
decades by men’s absolute earnings gains at the top of the labor market, and women’s absolute 
gains at the bottom (Gould 2016).  
In the South Atlantic (a) and Southern (b) regions, the gap is about 15-20% at the 10th 
quantile, rising steeply from the median to attain gaps of 30-40%. Some metros in the deep south 
and Florida look less steep mostly due to higher gaps at the bottom, while San Antonio is flatter 
due to reduced inequality at the top. Virginia Beach and New Orleans show consistent gaps in of 
30-40%, and DC and Baltimore also have lower consistent gaps. Most gender wage gaps decline 
a few points with the recession (New Orleans declines substantially), but top earning men pull 
away from women in Raleigh and Jacksonville. Slight but significant increases in inequality are 
also seen in Oklahoma City (through the 75th quantile), Miami (at the top), and San Antonio 
(below the median). Polarization is the dominant shape shift in these metros, although some 
metros show increases throughout. 
Excepting New York, Northeastern metro areas (c) generally show lower variation across 
the distribution, and Midwestern metros (d) are even more compressed. These are more 
traditionally-based economies that have often benefitted working-class men. Below-median 
gender wage gaps are generally in the 20s, rising into the 30s at the 90th quantile. They generally 
drop 5-10 percentage points with the recession (Detroit declines much more). Many Midwestern 
metro areas have steeper gender wage gaps post-recession, because below-median wage gaps 
drop significantly. However, declines are evident throughout all metros across the wage 
distribution, and no very significant increase is seen. (Pittsburgh stands out with above-median 
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increases, and Columbus has an increase at the bottom.) These metros show the decline in gender 
inequality discussed in the media and popular accounts, although the decline is minimal amongst 
top earners.  
Excepting Salt Lake City, gender wage gaps in the West (e) are generally lower than 
anywhere else, especially among top earners. Los Angeles’ steep gap is due to very small 
differences between low-paid men and women (the same is true of Phoenix, San Francisco, and 
Sacramento post-recession). Conversely, Riverside’s gaps are in the low-20s overall, and 
Seattle’s high and increasing inequality has a similarly flat shape. Few Western metros show 
significant overall declines post-recession. Most cities show some below-median declines but 
increases or stagnation in wage gaps at the top. High-inequality San Jose and Seattle see 
increases from the median. Las Vegas, Riverside and Los Angeles are the only metros where 
gender inequality drops significantly overall. 
 
 
Mapping the gender wage gap   >> Figure 2 about here<< 
 
Figure 2 details the estimated counterfactual quantiles of the gender wage gap for all 100 metro 
areas a) just prior to the Great Recession (2004-2006), and b) post-recession (2010-2012). The 
geographic variability of the gender wage gap is evident here, as well as how assessment of 
inequality is dependent on differences between low and high wage workers and their geographic 
patterns. More critically, this analysis points to the spatiality of unequal wages for working men 
and women, as well as how this spatiality may be evolving.  
At the 10th quantile, the gender wage gap is very low (less than 10%) in Los Angeles and 
Sacramento.6 Post-recession, a bevy of California metros and neighboring Phoenix, Tucson, and 
																																																						
6	It is also this low, but insignificant, in Durham, NC and Cape Coral/Fort Meyers, FL.	
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Las Vegas drop into this lowest category, as do Orlando and New York City. Seattle and Texas 
metros drop to relatively low levels. The distinctive geography of diminished gender inequality 
amongst the lowest-paid workers is predictable, given accounts of diminished prospects of 
immigrant men (Pew 2015). In other words, women’s relative gains may be little more than 
men’s absolute losses. The recession attenuates a divide between relatively higher inequality in 
the north than in the south because of marked declines in moderately high inequality in the upper 
Midwest and Northeast. Most of the non-border West, the central heartland of the country, and 
the South are stagnant.  
At the 25th quantile, only Los Angeles has a gap below 10%, joined by Sacramento, 
Fresno, and Vegas post-recession. New York City, DC, and a handful of metros scattered 
through the southwestern states and Florida have gaps below 20%. For the most part, the gender 
gap is moderate, and declines with the recession. A pre-recession array of high and very high 
inequality metros throughout the upper Midwest and the East is reduced to only Youngstown 
post-recession. California cities decline as well, although San Francisco and San Diego’s 
moderate gaps remain. These are among low-paid (probably not undocumented) workers in high-
wage global economies. Thus below the median the gender wage gap declines mostly in 
California (where it was already low) and more significantly in the Midwest and Northeast, with 
some declines along the Texas border.  
 From the median the lowest inequality category disappears, and only a few highly 
immigrant metros in California and Florida and along the Texas border have gender gaps below 
20%. Moderately-high gender inequality drops in several Midwestern and Northeastern metros, a 
small corner of the Southwest and some of Florida, but remains otherwise stagnant, especially 
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across the Western half of the US. The 15 high inequality metros scattered across the country 
pre-recession are reduced to resiliently-high San Jose, Provo/Ogden, Colorado Springs, Baton 
Rouge, Palm Bay, Raleigh, Bridgeport, and Youngstown by recessions’ end. In short, although 
the levels of gender wage inequality have increased from the bottom of the wage distribution, the 
geography of high and low gender wage gaps remains extremely similar.  
At the 75th quantile, the lowest inequality metros are the familiar Fresno, Stockton and 
McAllen, TX, joined by Riverside, Las Vegas and Los Angeles post-recession. These metros 
have large migrant worker populations and agricultural employment, conditions that many have 
associated with low gender inequality (McCall 1988, 2001), although they would be expected to 
affect the lower end of the wage distribution. However, most of the top 100 metros have 
differences above 30%. Declines are mostly in the upper Midwest and Southern California, but 
also in Orlando and Miami. Already-high gender wage gaps in the western half of the country 
look remarkably static, and Seattle’s gap increases. 
 At the 90th quantile gender inequality is extremely high, with the exceptions of Fresno 
(low) and Seattle, DC, and some metros in California, Florida, New York, and along the Texas 
border (moderately-high). More than a dozen metros have gender gaps above 40%, although 
those in the north again diminish with the recession. Moderately-high gaps in San Diego and 
Oxnard, the upper Midwest and the Northeast decline. However, coastal Seattle, San Jose, and 
San Francisco, Orlando, and Daytona increase into the highest category. Otherwise gender 
inequality amongst these top-paid workers remains resilient.  
 The result overall is that much of the Northeast and Midwest look less unequal post-
recession compared with the rest of the country, and lower levels of below-median inequality in 
California and Florida also decline. However, gender inequality increases at the top of the 
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distribution across the western US and in parts of Florida. This means that at the end of the 
recession gender inequality looks like a much more Western phenomenon, and much less like a 
Northeastern/Midwestern one. However, it also looks to be intensifying at the top of the income 
distribution. This is exacerbated by the fact that the below-median gap was more pronounced in 
the old economy Rustbelt, and the declines were more concentrated there (both in the Rustbelt 
and in the bottom half of the wage distribution). 
 
Finer-grained changes in the Gender Wage Gap       >> Figure 3 about here << 
Figure 3 provides a more granular summary of change. For example: Seattle’s gap decreases 
from 23.1-19.7% at the 10th quantile, a decrease of 14.7% (3.4 percentage points); and increases 
from 29.9-34.4% at the 90th quantile, an increase of 15.1% (4.5 percentage points). Thus, 
although these mapped changes seem small their magnitude is considerable. Figures 2 and 3 
need to be examined together to distinguish changes from metros where inequality was high 
initially versus similar changes where inequality had been low. 
This analysis shows again that recessionary declines were geographically uneven and 
occurred mostly at the bottom of the wage distribution. The most significant decreases are below 
the median in California (not including San Francisco and San Jose), the most heavily industrial 
Rustbelt metros of the Midwest and Northeast, and some Florida metros as well as New Orleans 
and Little Rock (both of which decline overall). Some of these are economies with historically 
strong advantages for male blue-collar workers, or largely agricultural immigrant workforces (in 
California), or had started to decline long before the recession. There are some increases in the 
gender wage gap even below the median, most notably in perennially-unequal Utah, El Paso, 
Oklahoma City, Columbus, Bridgeport, and Durham.  
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At the 75th quantile, there are few declines (mostly the upper Midwest and a few Western 
metros), and additional increases in Pittsburgh, Scranton, Lakeland, Jackson, Springfield, and the 
western US. At the top of the wage distribution there are more significant increases in inequality 
than significant decreases, and a good many smaller increases or stagnation. The biggest 
increases are in the “new economy” West (Seattle, Portland, San Francisco and San Jose and 
Modesto, Tucson and Colorado, as well as McAllen and always-high Utah); the western 
Midwest (Wichita, Springfield), Scranton, and the deep South. It should be mentioned, however, 
that California metros besides San Francisco/San Jose show declining gender inequality through 
the distribution, as do Boise, Las Vegas, and Albuquerque. There are more moderate but still 
significant increases in DC, Akron, and North Carolina; as well as much of the southwest. The 
few significant declines at the 90th quantile are overwhelmingly in the Rustbelt. 
 
Unfair inequality? Decomposing changes in the Gender wage gap >> Figure 4 about here << 
The counterfactual wage distributions presented thus far control for gendered differences in age, 
education, labor force experience, and occupation in that these covariates are used to estimate the 
overall gap. However, decomposing the differences into the effects of characteristics versus 
those of coefficients allows for analysis of explained (compositional) inequality versus 
unexplained or “unfair” inequality. Not surprisingly, unexplained inequality is higher where 
overall inequality is, and increases similarly across the distribution. However, it is interesting to 
examine whether the assessment of the geography of inequality or its change differ when only 
“unfair” inequality is examined. Given space constraints, I only briefly summarize notable 
differences. 
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Figure 4 replicates Figure 2 for the portion of the gender wage gap not attributable to 
men’s and women’s different characteristics. For the most part these maps look similar, but 
levels of unexplained inequality look somewhat higher. This is because women’s attributes can 
exceed men’s even though their earnings do not. For the lowest-paid workers, unexplained 
inequality is higher in most California, Florida, and southwestern metros, as well as New York 
City and a few places in the southeast. This may indicate the latent importance of immigration as 
mentioned above, but it also points out that the some of the least-unequal metros had very high 
unexplained inequality. Ogden and Portland, ME (at the 10th) and San Jose and Minneapolis (at 
the 25th) have gender wage gaps that are more explained by compositional effects. However, 
above the median unexplained inequality is higher from the Pacific Northwest through 
California, Arizona, Colorado, and border Texas, as well as central Florida and along the 
Northeast coast. Post-recession the patterns are generally similar if more consistent across the 
country: unexplained inequality looks geographically similar to overall inequality, and is mostly 
higher than expected. Thus, the decline in overall inequality across the Midwest and Northeast is 
largely attributable to compositional changes between male and female workers. These areas 
have higher levels of unexplained/”unfair” inequality post-recession. This is probably due to a 
combination of 1) drop-out of more skilled men or men in more beneficial occupations and 2) 
women’s (at least relative) upskilling. 
>> Figure 5 about here << 
Similarly, the metro areas where the change in unexplained inequality (Figure 5) is 
considerably lower than overall (Figure 3) are those where gendered compositional changes are 
important. Given the counterfactual modeling strategy employed, wherein covariate differences 
between full-time working men and women are used to construct the overall distribution, as well 
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as women’s increasing similarity to men in terms of labor force characteristics; these places are 
rare. They are most apparent at the bottom of the wage distribution. At the 10th quantile, 
unexplained inequality declines more than overall inequality in a series of Southwestern metros 
comprised mostly of agricultural areas in California and border Texas, and including Provo, 
Boulder, and Albuquerque. The same is true of Albuquerque at the 25th quantile, where El Paso 
and Tucson also show declines in unexplained inequality even as the overall gender wage gap 
increases. Here, “unfair” inequality declines relative to overall inequality, and increases in the 
gender wage gap are explained by compositional differences between male and female workers. 
This geographic distribution strongly suggests that these changes are attributable to declining 
immigration and employment of lower-wage male workers. There are no cases of lower 
unexplained inequality (signaling greater compositional effects) above the 25th quantile, barring 
some slight, nonsignificant changes at Phoenix and San Antonio’s 90th quantiles. 
 Conversely, places where changes in unexplained inequality exceed changes in overall 
inequality are common (Figure 5 shows more significant increases than in Figure 3).  At the 10th 
quantile, this means that Portland, San Francisco, Colorado Springs, Omaha, and Nashville have 
increases in inequality even with women’s relatively improved labor force characteristics (or 
men’s relatively worse ones), and the same is true for San Francisco, Minneapolis, New York, 
DC, and a few southern metros at the 25th quantile. Above the median the increases in unfair 
inequality are extremely high in the Pacific Northwest and the Southeast, with San Jose/San 
Francisco and northern Ohio showing very strong increases at the 90th quantile. Thus, places 
where the gender wage gap is declining still show increasing returns to men when compared with 
similar women, and places where the gender wage gap increases significantly with the recession 
	 22	
also show extremely high increases in returns to men relative to characteristics. This is especially 
true at the top of the wage distribution. 
 
Discussion  
 
Although there were some declines in gender inequality with the recession, this is far from the 
entire story. A handful of cities show increases throughout the wage distribution. Some of these 
places have received attention for gender inequity at the state scale: Utah, Oklahoma, and 
Mississippi have all ranked very low over time on multiple measures of gender inequality 
(DiNoia 2002), and Utah is at the bottom of the list of all of Florida et al’s rankings of women’s 
total and creative class employment and wages (2014). Raleigh-Durham, Tucson, and Seattle 
provide examples of broadly increasing gender inequality, in that their transition to a post-
industrial economy has been rapid, while an older manufacturing labor force remains strong 
(Moretti 2012), conditions that advantage men over women across the entire wage distribution. 
This transition has been overlooked as a possibility in a literature that emphasizes more complete 
shifts between industrial and post-industrial economies. Additionally, 18 metros (mostly in the 
West, Ohio/Pennsylvania, and Florida) show increases above the 75th or 90th percentile. The 
increases are particularly significant and visible in Seattle, San Jose, and San Francisco -- places 
with declining gender wage gaps amongst the lowest-earners -- meaning that increasing 
inequality at the top would be obscured in analysis of median wages. And much of the South 
shows essentially static gender wage inequality. The story that the gender wage gap has 
continued to decline significantly, or increased its decline with the recession, is completely true 
in fewer than half of the top US metropolitan areas. 
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 The maps thus show that the gender wage gap shifted in two important ways during the 
recession. First, the most significant changes overall are reductions in gender inequality in upper 
Midwestern metros extending to New York and Pennsylvania, as well as in some smaller 
agricultural California metros. These were more significant below the median, and much rarer 
above it. With quite significant above-median increases, gender inequality becomes much more 
about top earners with the recession. Second, the maps demonstrate a general spatial shift of 
gender inequality from Midwest/Northeast metros to West Coast metros. These two shifts are 
intertwined: the pre-recession distributional pattern was dominated by differences between 
lower-waged workers in the Midwest and Northeast, but was increasingly about higher-waged 
workers in Western metro areas post-recession. Gender inequality shifted from areas of the 
country where it had been more compressed (moderately high at the bottom and not much higher 
at top, as in Figure 1b) to areas where it is low at bottom and high at top (as in Figure 1c). Where 
declines in these second more polarized distributions occur, they decline more at the bottom of 
the wage distribution, and in most cases the gender wage gap is stagnant or increases. Further, 
these places have increases in “unfair” inequality both at the bottom of the distribution, where 
wage gaps are narrowing, and at the top of the wage distribution where wage gaps are stagnant or 
increasing. 
The intersection of the distributional and spatial analysis provides insights into how 
gender inequality is geographically-configured, and how this changes with the recession. At the 
very bottom of the distribution, the gender wage gap is lowest in immigrant metros in the West 
and it is lower in a broader array of these, especially hard-hit housing markets, after the 
recession. Below the median, women experience the greatest gaps with men in the Midwest and 
Northeast, although these only remain post-recession in the worst-hit Rustbelt metros, and in 
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solidly unequal Baton Rouge and Utah. Above the median, only the most agricultural of 
California and Texas border metros (Stockton, Fresno, Riverside, McAllen, Los Angeles) have 
low levels of gender inequality. There are declines across the Midwest and Northeast, especially 
in the Rustbelt, and some increases in the postindustrial knowledge-economy cities of the West 
(San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle). 
 Gender inequality is spatially polarizing. The sticky floors of older Rustbelt 
manufacturing economies no longer explain the gender wage gap to the extent that the glass 
ceilings of Silicon Valley or Seattle tech firms do. This is critical to understand for several 
reasons. First, even accounting for differences in education and participation across the entire 
wage distribution, the gender wage gap is persistent. This is not surprising when we think about 
different configurations of inequality across different labor markets, as McCall did nearly two 
decades ago. Average gender inequality can be low and declining in places like Los Angeles or 
New York simply because already small differences between the lowest-earning men and women 
diminish even further with the recession. However, at higher earnings levels in these same cities, 
a very high gender wage gap may diminish only slightly, stagnate, or even increase while returns 
to men increase or remain very high. These large, highly unequal cities are often considered to 
have low levels of gender inequality. In part, this is due to their polarized wage structures, 
wherein rewards for those at the top are high and those at the bottom are low, perhaps especially 
for immigrant men.7 It would also be interesting to consider the effects of reduced immigration 
during the recession (Pew 2015) on gender inequality. Given the spatial and distributional 
patterns in evidence here, it is reasonable to assume that reduced immigration has played a part 
in attenuated gender inequity. Many of those affected by the Man-cession may not be visible in 
																																																						
7	This also makes clear why the median statistics so often reported are misleading, in that they reflect 
none of the runaway inequality amongst top earners, where gaps are increasing most.	
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US census data, although their absence from the US would shift analysis toward women’s 
advantage at the lower end of the labor market, even as men’s advantages at the top remain and 
increase.  
In contrast, the more traditionally-configured economies of the Midwest and upstate New 
York demonstrate less steep patterns of gender wage inequality, where differences between men 
and women are moderately high at the bottom and not so high at the top. In these places, sticky 
floors result from jobs and working conditions that benefit men more than women (like 
unionized manufacturing jobs), but the glass ceilings are lower (and the 90th quantile as well). 
The wage gap declines with womens’ increased similarity to men through both educational gains 
and through men’s relatively greater recessionary losses (although men’s returns remain high). If 
post-industrial knowledge economy cities are more open to highly-skilled women (Florida et al 
2014), they seem decreasingly likely to pay them equally. Redirecting focus from women’s 
disadvantages, Kassenboehmer and Sinning assert that while women’s wage growth is explained 
by significantly increased education, skills, and experience “men’s average wage growth remains 
unexplained” (2014). Here, I find that “unexplained” male advantage generally increases with 
the Great Recession, rather than attenuating. 
 
Conclusions 
As McDowell and her colleagues (2005) point out, most analysis of the transition to post-
industrial economies has neglected the significance of gender. Consequently, the ability to 
understand gender inequality under major economic shifts is limited by a focus on the shifts from 
a manufacturing economy that benefitted men to a polarized post-industrial economy 
characterized by increasing numbers of women both in services and in the knowledge economy. 
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This research demonstrates that this shift has a geography with implications for the gender gap 
and how it is assessed. If, as many scholars have asserted, women have acted to buffer male 
employment even where it is declining, then understanding the geography of the gender wage 
gap is also critical to understanding the geography of the post-industrial economy and indeed of 
the post-recessionary economy.  
 The analysis presented in this paper is frustratingly limited in its ability to answer to 
reasons for continuing gender inequality or its spatiality, especially compared with feminist 
geographers’ more intensive forays into the structures of specific local economies, labor markets, 
or workplaces. Yet the detailed empirics of this middle ground mapping establish how little we 
understand the gender wage gap, let alone how it changed. That said, it establishes the continuing 
dominance of older patterns of economic space, undergirded always by gendered state policies 
surrounding social reproduction, and resulting gendered employment and workforce outcomes. 
Pre-recession, especially among below-median workers, gender inequality was Rustbelt-
dominant. These inequities diminish strongly with the recession, continuing longer-term 
declines. At the very bottom of the wage distribution, where declines in the gender wage gap are 
obvious, it is apparent that declines for male workers in agricultural regions with large 
undocumented immigrant populations are important. This means that declines in the gender 
wage gap below and at the median are tied to male declines, the long-term or recessionary-
focused decline in traditional labor markets, and possibly selective immigration and return 
migration. The significance of these shifts for racial and ethnic wage inequality and its spatiality 
warrant further investigation, especially given rapidly changing configurations of inequalities of 
race, class, and gender within and between US labor markets (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vannerman 
1999; McCall 2001; Goodwin-White 2014).  
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 The increases in inequality at the top of the wage distribution have a different geography 
that is more difficult to explain; one that pops up in knowledge economy cities in Western states 
where gender inequality is often asserted to be low. We know much less about this gender gap. 
This paper uncovers its increasing significance, and it appears to be critical to understanding the 
changing map of American inequality. The gender wage gap is not declining, when we look 
across the income distribution and across American spaces, although it is shifting. This is an 
important corrective to accounts that gender inequality is over. Further, understanding where and 
how it is not signals critical interactions of social inequality and labor market allocation 
emerging from differing local regimes of accumulation and enforcement mechanisms. Although 
models were estimated for metro areas to best approximate labor markets, there are also clearly 
some effects of state and regional political economies, and of uneven development more broadly 
at work. These can only be glimpsed here, but I hope to address these inter-scalar place effects in 
future research. Writing twenty years ago on the changing map of American poverty, Kodras 
argued that “Economic restructuring thus spatially reorganizes the relative advantage of different 
places according to the shifting needs of capital, with previous layers of investment and the 
legacy of social relations creating a context from which each place seeks to compete” (1997). 
Although our analyses are different, her portrait of gender inequality in Silicon Valley is eerily 
amplified two decades and several economic shifts later. There is little doubt that ongoing gender 
inequality is both context and outcome of the shifting inequalities of post-recessionary America, 
and that geographers could usefully contribute much further research in this area. 
 Finally, wages are just one small picture of gender inequality, especially wages of full-
time full-year workers with occupational controls. While this paper demonstrates the importance 
of counterfactual distributions and looking across contextually-unequal labor markets, it falls 
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short of explaining the mechanisms that condition these inequalities. Future research should 
consider factors that may have conditioned the geography of both the gendered supply of 
workers and how gendered rewards intersect with changing inequalities of race, class, and 
immigration.8 Did women spend more time out of the labor force in some states than others, and 
why? Does occupational gendering matter differently in different places? What determines 
which workers suffer most? In Trump’s America, there are increasing reasons to consider how 
austerity programs – from reductions in healthcare accessibility, food assistance, and anti-
poverty programs to defunding STEM outreach to girls – intersect with labor market inequalities. 
The devolved nature of US federalism means that localities have a significant role to play in 
whether and where the gender revolution stalls or continues. 
 
																																																						
8	I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for these points and others that improved this piece.	
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